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                               1. Introduction
Most economic analysis of transfer pricing concentra£es on the case of complete
pareRt firm control [see Coptthorne (1971), Horst (1971), Eden (1978, 1983, 1985)
and SamuelsoR (1982), etc.]. The parent maximizes joint net proftts from drfferent
subsidiaries and corporate taxes induce transfer prices to be set equai to either
an upper or lower bound exogenously imposed by regulating governments.
Howevey, some authors realize tha£ in many instances, affilialte control is atso
important iR order to foster greater divisional autonomy and to improve prof±t
performance [see for exampie, Dieweyt ( 1985), Ka£yak (1983), Stoughton and
Talmor (1994)]. In such a scenario, the parent firm as weU as the subsidiaries
share the decision making process. The parent thus has to design trans£er prices
which can take into aecount of the decisions made by the subsidiaries. It may even
be the case that the transfer price Stself is an outcome deteymined by bargaining
between the parent and the subsidiaries [Stoughton and Taimor, and Chalos and
Haka (1990)].
      In practice, mu]Ginationai corporations (MNCs) can have subsidiaries in
markets that are very diffeTent in nature. Fov lnstance, iR many less developed
countries (LDCs), there extsts upper limits on foreign ownership of businesses.
Subsidiaries in the LDCs may take the form of internationat joint ventures; when
Japanese automoblle makers set up production facilities in the U.S., £hey have to
negotiaie with the UAW (Unired Auto Workers Union). Sueh subsidiaries may take
the form of uRionized firms; stM some other subsidiaries may take the form of
labor maRaged firms (e.g., firms in the former Yugosiavia, or some believe, Japan).
      The objective of the present paper is to investiga:te when the subsidiary
ean make some pyoduetion decisions on tts own, ai what level wiU the parent
charge the transfer price. We find that under different market structuye, the
parent firm wilIL set the transfer price differently in order to influence the
decisions of the subsidiayy. In particular, we show that wlth a profit maximizing
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subsidiary,the parentfirm usually charges twotypes oftyansfer price: an upper
or a lower ]tmiting priee depending on the profit tax yates; with a joint-venture
(JV) subsldiary, the same results hold, but the seleetion criteria diiffer, since the
JV subsidiary is not wholly owned by the MNC parent; with a unionized subsidiary,
there exists three types of tyansfer prices: the upper price, the lower price, and
onethat is in-between; with a laboy raanaged subsidiayy, we agaan find three types
of transfer prices, but the exact levels are d"fferent. Thus in some cases, we
obtain transfer prices as interior soiutlons, instead of the corner solutions as
always obtained in the case of compiete parent control.1 we also demonstrate that
the level of the intermediate input supplied by the lvfNC differs in each case. In
addition,weconductsomeinterestingcomparativestaticsanalysisundevdifferent
market structure.
      Section 2 establishes four minYmodels of transfer price determlnation, in
which the subsidiary is located in four different market structures, and section
3 concludes.
                               2. The Model
Consider the case of a MNC consisting of two subsidiayies, iocated in two different
countries 1 and 2 respectlvely. The ttpstream branch produces one intermediake
input, with a gross profit function of
where m is the transfer price of sellmg the intermediaLe input to the downstream
branch, x is the quaRtity of the intermediante input, and c(x) is the cost of
producing x, with c'>O and c" non--negative. The downstream branch uses both the
intermediate input and laboy to produee the finatoutput. Its gross profit function
can be wriicten as
    1  Kant (!988) also obtains interier transfer pf･lces, but. his itnalyffis iu bituttd tm
uncertainty. Donnenfeld and Prusa (1990>, and Stoughton and Talmor <1994) anaiyzed the
information asymmetry aspect of transfer prieing.
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      K2=r(q)-mx -- [w-<b(x)]q (lb)
where q is the quantscy of the final good, r(q) is the revenue function, and w is
the uRit wage eost. To pyoduce one unk of the final good, exactly one untt of labor
is needed by an appyopriate choice of units. Thus q is also equal to the amount of
labor employed. When the intermediate input is used, productivity increases. We
model this as a reduction in the unit cost of production, ¢(x), wia h ¢x>O.
      The profit of the parent firm is a sum of the joint net profits from the two
subsidiaries, which can be written as
where tl and t2 aye the profit tax rates in the two respective countries.
      To analyze the phenomenon of affUiate control and the dif£erent structure
the subsidiary fiym can take, we assurne that the downstream b?anch can make
some independent decisions in the production process. Specdically, the
downstream branch decides the !evei of the final output (and the amount of labor
to be hired), while the parent firm determines the transfer price and the level of
the interf;}ediate input. In order to let the pareRt's decision affect that of the
subsidiary, we assume a two stage game, with the parent being the leader,
choosing in the first stage, and the subsidiary the follower, choosing in the
seeond stage. Thus the choice the subsidiary makes, q, is a function of the
pareRt's choices, m and x.
      In the remainder oE the paper, we use the basie modei to investigate the
determina:tion of the transfer prl¢e when the downstream subsidiary is organized
under different market structure. !n order to ensure consistency, all mini-models
are solved backwards, i.e. we solve the subsidiary's problem in the second stage
first, substttute the solution into the parent firm's problem in the first stage game
and then solve ik.
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                      2.1 Profirt lvfaximizing Subsidiary
First, suppose that the downstream branch is a regular profit maximizing
subsSdiary. We use this case as a bench--mark. Then in the second stage of the
decision game, the subsidiary chooses the quantity of the imal output to maximize
its own profit (net of the profit tax), yieiding the following first order condition
(FOC)
which gives the optlmal finaa output as a function of the unit wage cost and the
amount o£ intermediate input used. TotaJ differentiation of (3) yields dq/dx>O and
dq/dw<O, which implies tha:t aR increase in the intermediate input (respectively
the wage cost) raises (respectively reduees) the level of the finaJ output.
      !n the first stage of the game, the parent flrm determinesthe transfer price
and the amount of the inteymediate input to be produced. Manmizing (2) wiLh
respective to m and x, we obtain respectively
      rex:(1-tl) ox,/ex+(1-t2) ex,/ox ww--O (4b)
where axi/ox = m-cx, and ox2/ex :qepx-m･
      Condition (4a) is posttively signed if t2>tl, and negatively signed if t2<tl･
Accordingly, the optimal transfer price chosen by the parent firm is the upper
bound or the lower bound set by respective goverRments. The is a result obta tned
by the elassical lit eraLure on transfer pricing [see Copdrthorne (1971) and Host
(1971)]. Here we see tha£ it holds even in the case when the downstream
subsidiary determines independent!y the quantity of the final output.
                         2.2 Unionized Subsidiary
In this section, we anaiyze the case in which the downstream branch is unionized.
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As is common in the labor-management models, wages are determined through
negotiations between the subsidiary and the labor ttnion. Let the union's utility
be represented by the foXtowing function [see Brander and Spencer (1988)]
      u(w,q) uc qE(w)+(N-q)e(n) (5)
where N is the total membership of the union and 5w(w)>O. Whlle q members
receive the negotiated wage w, the rest of the members receives the wage n in the
residual seetor. Thus n can be interpreted as the reservakion wage or
unemployment eompensation, whieh is treated as a constant here,
      Following BraRder and Spencer, we model the negotiation between the
subsidiary and the union as a cooperative Nash bargaining game [Nash(1953)], and
that bargaining is for the wage rate only.2 !f bargaining breaks down, on the one
hand, no union workers are hired and union uti] ity goes down to uoxNe(n); On the
other hand, the subsidiary does not produce any output. But it has to incur the
cost of buying the intermediate input. Thus the net proftt of the subsidiary if
bargaining breaks down is Ko=-mx.
      Given the above bargaining structure, the Nash product, which is a pyoduct
of the parties' payoffs, net of the opportuniry costs at the threat point (if
bargaming breaks down), can be written as
      G(w)=(u--uo) [(1･-t2)x2-xo] (6)
where (1--t2)K2 is the subsidiary's net proftt.
      In the second stage o£ the game, the downstream branch negotiates wdrth the
labor union the wage rate and tt atso determines the quanttty of the final output.
Maximizing (6) wtth respeet to w yields
      ew[(i-t2)"2-Ko] -'(1-t2)(u-uo) =O (7)
    2 MeDonald and Solow {1981) show that bargaining for wage alone is not efficient and that
the two partles ean be made bettev off if both wage and employrnent are negottated. However, Clark
and Oswald (1993) argue that unions put more weight on pay Lhan on ernployrnent. Furthermor(t, fnany
:[" ':'E:'vE ".::,s.r iJ. ;r's.':".it;.;, lpt-}.t,.ptT,tx..En.egercent. bargejni.ng j$ ijsva]]y for wages, whjIG emp]oyment is
determined by the firm unilater'aiiy,
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Condition (7) gives iraplicitly the negotiated wage rate as a function of the
transfer price m and the intermediate input x. And maxirnizing the subsidiary's net
profit with respect the q, we obtain condition (3) again.
      Tota]Jy differentiating conditions (3) and (7), and assuming that the second
order ¢onditions for a maximum are satisfied, Le･ A = Gww rqq m Gwq rqw > O,
where G.. = E..[(i-t2)it2 - xo] -- 2(i--t2)q4. < O, G.q = -(i-t2)[g(w)--e(n)] < O,
rqq< O, and rqw = --1, theR we obtain the foXtowing condscions
      dW/dM xx -t2XEwrqq/A>O (8a)
      dW/dX={-[(1-'t2)q¢x+Mt2]Ewrqq+epxGwg}/A (8C)
      dq/dx=--{[(i-t2)qrp.+mt2]6.÷epxG..}/A (8d)
      Condition (8a) implies that an increase in the transfer price raises the
negotiated wage ra£e. This ayises because ijr m increases, then the downstream
subsidiary wUl use iabor to substitute for the now more expensive intermediate
input. The union wilIL take advantage of this opportunky and raise the negotiated
wage in the bargaining game. Condition (8b) says that as a resu]ic of an increase
in the transfer pyice, the net profk of the subsidiary falls and thus it chooses to
produce less final output.
      The signs of conditions (8c) and (8d) are ambiguous. However, i£ ex is iarge,
i.e. the marginal contribution o£ x to the final output is large, then (8c) < e and
(8d) > O, implying that an increase in x reduces the negotiated wage rate and
increases the final output. The wage rake deereases because labor is substituted
by the intermediake input.
      !n the first stage, the parent £irm chooses the transfer price and the level
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of the intermediate input to ma>cLmize totak net profits, realizing that the
negotiated wage and the finaJt output depend on m and x. The FOCs are
      dx/dm ut xm+Tzwdw/dm (9a)
      dTt/dx=3rx+"wdw/dx=O (9b)
where rrm = (t2--tl)x, -w = -(1-t2)q, and itx =(Ftl) Oz,/Ox + (1-t2) O#2/Ox ･
      Condhion (9) contrasts the ¢ase when the downstream subsidiary is a profit
maximizing branch. Compared with conditions (4a) and (4b), conditions (9a) and
(9b) each has one extra term, which takes into ac¢ouRt respectively the effects of
m and x on the negotiated wage rat e. Thus the transfer prSee and the level of the
intermediate input in the two cases will be different.
      To be more specifle, if t2<tl, then ceRdkSon (9a) is negatively signed, and
the transfer price chosen wi[L be the lower bound, the same as in the profrt
maximizing case; if t2>tl, then there aye two cases, since the sign of (9a) can be
ei£her posStive or zero: if pos" ive, theB the traRsfer chosen is the upper bound;
if zero, then the transfer pyice chosen is lower than the uppey bound and higher
than the lower bouRd, i.e. an interior solution.
     By condirt ion (9b), if ¢x is large (respectiveiy siriaEL), then the optimal level
of x is higher (respectively lower) than the case of a profit ma>CLmizing subsidiary.
                     2.3 Labor--lvlanaged Subsidiary
Now consider the case when the downstream subsidiary is a labo"managed (LM)
                                                                     3branch.In L}vl firms, instead of proftts, average income per worker is maximized.
Let the average income per workey in the downstream subsidiary be
DiffereRtiating with respect to q to give
    3 See Ward <1958) and Vanek (1970),
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where Ox2/0q =rq-K>x--w･ Condition (11) gives the optimal level of the final output
as a fuRction of m and x in the case of the Lty! subsidiary. Tota [ty differentiating
it to yield
      dq/dm = -qr                 qq
      Condrdon (12a) states that an increase in the use of the intermediate input
raises the final output, ceteris paribus. Condrtion (12b) implies that an increases
in the t℃ansfer price wiR al$o raise the final output. This may seem counter
intumave by casual observation. Howevey, St is well known that the L}vl firm tends
to have many perverse relat ions.4 In the present model, it implies that when the
transfer price increases, the cost of production for the subsidiary also rises
accordiRgly. Average income maximization requires tha:t the membership be
increased so thai the burden of cost can be shared more widely, Consequently the
level of £inal output rises.
      In the first stage, again the payent firm chooses m and x to maximize total
net profits, taking into account thak q is a fuRction of m and x, which yields
      dK/dm -- "m+(Yt2) ex,/ag dq/dm (13a)
      dK/dx=".+(1--t2) ex,/aq dq/dx=O (13b)
where Em and Rx are given uRder condition (9), and osc2/eq ex ff2/q from (11).
      Now we compare condition (13) with condkions (4) and (9). By condition
(13a), if t2>tl, the sigR of (i3a) is positive, then the transfer price chosen wru be
the upper bound,the same as in the profit maximizing ease; if t2<tl,then there are
    4 See Ward (1958) aRd Vanek (i970). For exemple, when output price increases, the LM firm's
suppiy decreases, thus generating the downward sloping supply eurve.
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two cases, since the sign of (13a) can be either negative or zero: if negart ive, then
the tyansfer chosen is the lower bound; i£ zero, then the transfer price chosen is
between the upper bound and the lower bouRd, i.e. an interior solution again.
      By coRdhion (13b), the level of the intermediate input is higher in the Llvl
case than in the profit maxtmizing case, since the second term in (13b) is posikive,
Mowever, we can Rot tell whetheT this level of the intermediate input is higher or
not than that in the case of the unionized subsidiary.
                       2.4 Joint Venture Subsidiary
Finaky we consider the case when the downstream branch is ajoint venture wikh
a different owner. We suppose that the level of the £inal output is determined by
negotiations between the JV partners. If bargaining breaks down, then no final
output is produced. Hence the threat point is zero for both JV partners. Also
assume that share s o£ the JV profit belongs to the downstream subsidiary, and
share i--s goes to the othey partRer, where s is determined exogenously. The Nash
product of the bargaining game for q is
       H(q)={s(1-t2)-2}{(1--s)(1-t2)sc2} (14)
Maximizing the Nash product with respect to q, we obtaln
                '
which is the same as eondition (3). It gives the final output as a function of x in
the JV case.
      Wtth a JV subsidiary, the parent's totai net profit is
      TijV=(1-tl)re1+s(1-t2)X2 (16)
since (1-s)(1-t2)K2 is the profit of the JV partner, which does not belong to the
rvlNC. The FOCs to rnaximize (16), choosing m and x, are
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      d"V/dx -- (2-ti) asc,/ox +s(i-t2) ax,/ax =O (i7b)
where T=(1--tl)--s(i-t2), and aK,/ax and orc2/ox are given under condi£ion (4).
Condition (17) is a little different from condition (4). Whlle (17a) implies that the
transfer price chosen by the parent firm wll2 be eiicher the upper bound or the
iowey bound, the importance of the host country's profit tax rate is downgraded
accordingtotheJVshareofthesubsidiary.Thetransferpriceiseithertheupper
limtting price or the lower limiting price if T is positive oy negative. Condition
(17b) says that in choosiRg x, the parent firm takes into account that the
subsidiayy is a JV and only propoirtion s of the JV profit belongs to the lvlNC.
Therefove, the transfey price and the ievel of the intermediate input produced in
this case differ from those in other cases,
                             3. Conclusions
Mukinationals operate in maykets that are different in nat ure. This paper extends
the classicallkerature on multina£ional firms and transfer pricing.We showedthat
with subsidiayies in differeRt markets, the MNC charges transfer prices
differeRtiy, not just limited to the boundary prices imposed by governments. In
particulay, interior solutions are possible. We also found ehat the MNC supplies
different ievels of the intermediate input to the downstream subsidiary in
different markets. Hopefully the above anaiysis has shed light on some issues of
trans£er pricing that were ignored in tke ltterature.
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